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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lawrence R. Lutton appeals from the district court’s entry of a withheld 
judgment entered pursuant to Lutton’s guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter.  On 
appeal, Lutton claims the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 Lutton was driving on Arrowrock Road.  (R., pp. 64-66.)  Lutton had been 
drinking that day.  (Id.)  Lutton lost control of his vehicle and wrecked his vehicle 
into Arrowrock Reservoir.  (Id.)  Lutton’s two sons,  and  were in the 
car with him.  (Id.)  Joseph Mikitish, a neighbor, witnessed the crash and went 
into the water to assist.  (Id.)  With assistance, Lutton and  were able to 
get out of the car.  (Id.)  Lutton and  needed medical care, so Mr. Mikitish 
drove them towards Boise.  (Id.)   who was two, had not been found when 
they left for Boise.  (Id.)   
 Approximately an hour later, at 11:10 p.m., Officers Anjelkovich and 
Zimmer, of the Boise Police Department, stopped Mr. Mikitish because he was 
driving 60 miles an hour in a 35 mile an hour zone.  (R., p. 65; 3/12/15 Tr., p. 35, 
L. 5 – p. 36, L. 4, p. 65, L. 25 – p. 66, L. 8.)  Officer Zimmer made contact with 
Mr. Mikitish and Officer Anjelkovich made contact with Lutton, who was in the 
passenger seat.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 2-25, p. 66, Ls. 13-24.)   
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While she was speaking with Lutton, Officer Anjelkovich could smell 
alcohol.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 1-9.)  Lutton told Officer Anjelkovich that he had 
consumed alcohol that day.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-12.)  
Mr. Mikitish told the officers he was concerned for Lutton’s health because 
Lutton had been in the water for 30 minutes and was severely hypothermic. 
(R., p. 65.)  Mr. Mikitish also told the officers that he had learned from Boise 
County dispatch that  had been found.  (R., p. 66.)   was being flown 
via life-flight to St. Luke’s hospital.  (R., p. 67.)   
 The officers called an ambulance for Lutton and   (R., p. 66.)  
Once Lutton was in the ambulance the paramedics took off Lutton’s wet clothes 
and gave him a blanket.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 19 , Ls. 7-14, p. 80, Ls. 10-11, p. 91, 
L. 25 – p. 92, L. 11, p. 102, L. 23 – p. 103, L. 5.)  The ambulance transported 
Lutton and  to St. Luke’s hospital.  (R., p. 66.)   
Officer Anjelkovich remained at the scene with Mr. Mikitish for 
approximately 30 minutes and then headed to St. Luke’s.  (R., p. 66.)  At 
St. Luke’s Officer Anjelkovich recontacted Lutton.  (Id.)  Lutton admitted he had 
consumed two to three beers between 1:00 and 3:00 that afternoon.  (Id.)   
 Because of the multiple counties involved, Trooper Vance of the Idaho 
State Police was called in to assist.  (R. p. 66.)  At the hospital, Trooper Vance 
read Lutton the ALS advisory form.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-11; R., pp. 66-67, 
70.)  Lutton consented to having his blood drawn.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-11, 
p. 9, Ls. 7-9, p. 25, Ls. 8-14; R., p. 74.)  The blood test showed a blood alcohol 
concentration of 0.092.  (R., p. 64.)   did not survive.  (Id.)   
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The state charged Lutton with Vehicular Manslaughter and Operating a 
Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs.  (R., pp. 15-
18.)  Lutton moved to suppress evidence obtained from the blood draw. 
(R., pp. 26-36, 64.)   
The district court held a suppression hearing.  (R., pp. 40-42.)  At the 
suppression hearing, Officer Anjelkovich testified she made contact with Lutton 
who was in the passenger seat of Mr. Mikitish’s car and she could smell alcohol.  
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 1-9.)  Lutton told Officer Anjelkovich that he was driving 
his vehicle on Arrowrock and lost control of his car and it went off into the 
reservoir.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 37, L. 23 – p. 38, L. 5.)  Lutton told Officer Anjelkovich 
that he had consumed alcohol that day.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-12.)  Officer 
Anjelkovich explained she was concerned that alcohol may have been involved 
in Lutton’s car crash because Lutton admitted to drinking earlier in the day and 
she could smell alcohol in the car.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 46, Ls. 7-17.)   
Officer Anjelkovich testified that when someone suspected of DUI needs 
medical attention the police do not require the suspects to do field sobriety tests.  
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 59, Ls. 4-12.)  Lutton said he was cold and experiencing 
hypothermia because of his attempts to retrieve his son.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 38, 
Ls. 1-23.)  Officer Zimmer testified that when they made contact with Lutton 
everyone was “all wet.”  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 21-23.)  Officer Anjelkovich 
testified that by the time she got to the hospital and recontacted Lutton she could 
no longer smell alcohol.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 15-21.)   
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At the hospital, Lutton only admitted to having consumed three beers 
earlier in the afternoon, between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 51, L.s 5-
16.)  Officer Anjelkovich testified that, in her 20-plus years’ experience of 
investigating DUIs, individuals who are driving under the influence of alcohol very 
often minimize the amount of alcohol they have actually consumed.  (3/12/15 Tr., 
p. 56, L. 24 – p. 57, L. 6.)   
Trooper Vance testified that he was dispatched to St. Luke’s hospital 
shortly after midnight to collect a blood draw.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 4-14.)  
Trooper Vance was informed that there was a crash with a possible fatality and 
alcohol involved on Arrowrock Road in Boise County.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 4, L. 25 – 
p. 5, L. 5.)  Trooper Vance made contact with Lutton and Officer Anjelkovich.  
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 4, L. 15 – p. 5, L. 25.)  By this point, Lutton was probably only 
wearing a blanket.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 19 , Ls. 7-14.)   
Trooper Vance read Lutton the ALS advisory form.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 6, 
Ls. 5-11.)  Trooper Vance testified that Lutton consented to having his blood 
drawn.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-11, p. 9, Ls. 7-9, p. 25, Ls. 8-14.)   
Q. And then you told him he had to have a blood draw, and he 
said okay? 
 
A. He said okay when I asked for the blood draw. 
 
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 2-4.)   
Nurse Chapman testified that she drew blood from Lutton.  (3/12/15 Tr., 
p. 62, Ls. 2-14.)  Nurse Chapman recalled that Lutton was calm and that he was 
not in handcuffs.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 62, L. 18 – p. 63, L. 5.)  She also recalled that 
the officers were not combative or unpleasant.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 63, Ls 6-11.)  
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Nurse Chapman testified that Lutton was cooperative during the blood draw.  
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 18-23.)   
Karla Sampson, a staff chaplain at St. Luke’s, testified that when she 
asked the police officers if Lutton could go see his son, the police officers said 
that would not be a problem.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 13-24, p. 87, Ls. 5-18.) 
Ms. Sampson also testified that Lutton had a blanket wrapped around him.  
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 10-11.)   
Lutton testified that the officers would not let him see his son until he gave 
a blood sample and Lutton thought the blood sample was mandatory.  (3/12/15 
Tr., p. 97, L. 13 – p. 98, L. 21.)  Lutton testified that the paramedics had removed 
his clothes once he was put in the ambulance and he was wearing a blanket.  
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 91, L. 25 – p. 92, L. 11, p. 102, L. 23 – p. 103, L. 5.)  Lutton 
admitted the officers were courteous and he was not handcuffed.  (3/12/15 
Tr., p. 102, Ls. 19-22.)  Lutton also conceded that he did not refuse to give blood 
and “did not say no.”  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 103, Ls. 6-15.)   
The state filed a post hearing briefing and objection to Lutton’s motion to 
suppress.  (R., pp. 43-49.)  Lutton also filed a post hearing brief.  (R., pp. 54-63.) 
Lutton argued that the blood draw was not lawful because the officers did not 
have reasonable grounds to believe that Lutton was driving a vehicle while he 
was under the influence and his consent was not voluntary because the officers 
would not let him see his son until he took the blood test.  (See R., pp. 29-33, 58-
63.)   
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The district court denied the motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 64-76.)  The 
district court found that, because Lutton crashed his car into the reservoir and 
admitted to drinking, and because the officer smelled alcohol when Lutton was in 
Mr. Mikitish’s vehicle, there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that Lutton was 
“impaired under Idaho Code § 18-8002.”  (R., pp. 70-71.)   
The district court also found, among other things, that portions of Lutton’s 
testimony regarding the circumstances of the blood draw were not credible. 
(R., p. 74.) The district court found that Lutton’s testimony that he was told 
repeatedly that he could not see his son unless he provided a blood sample was 
not credible.  (R., p. 74.)  The district court found that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, Lutton “did not revoke or withdraw his implied consent, and he 
voluntarily consented to the blood draw.”  (R., p. 74.)   
Lutton filed a motion to reconsider.  (R., pp. 77-89.)  Before the district 
court ruled on the motion, Lutton pled guilty to Vehicular Manslaughter pursuant 
to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement.  (R., pp. 90-91, 95-102, 109-111.)  Lutton’s 
guilty plea allowed Lutton to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 
(R., p. 110.)  The district court entered a withheld judgment.  (R., pp. 103-108.)  
Lutton timely appealed.  (R., pp. 113-116.)   
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ISSUE 
 
Lutton states the issue on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court error [sic] in denying [sic] motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Lutton failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Lutton Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion 
To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
 Lutton argues the district court erred both when it determined the officers 
had reasonable grounds to believe he was driving under the influence and when 
it found he consented to the blood draw.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-23.)  
Lutton’s arguments are without merit.  The officers had reasonable grounds to 
believe Lutton was driving under the influence because Lutton admitted to 
drinking, Lutton lost control of his car, Lutton crashed his car into the reservoir, 
and Officer Anjelkovich smelled alcohol when she first contacted Lutton.  (See 
R., pp. 70-71.)  Moreover, correct application of the law to the facts found by the 
district court shows that Lutton never withdrew his implied consent.  (See 
R., pp. 73-74.)  Finally, in addition to implied consent, Lutton also gave actual 
consent to the blood draw.  The totality of the circumstances shows that the 
officers treated Lutton with empathy and courtesy and Lutton gave actual 
consent to the blood draw.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
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C. Lutton Implicitly Consented To The Blood Draw And The Officers Had 
Reasonable Grounds To Believe That Lutton Was Operating A Vehicle 
While Under The Influence 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is 
a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).  “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).   
Consent is a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).  Implied 
consent is a type of consent statutorily provided for by Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), 
which provides: 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to 
evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 
18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his consent to evidentiary 
testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances, 
provided that such testing is administered at the request of a peace 
officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, 
Idaho Code. 
 
I.C. § 18-8002(1).   
  10 
Pursuant to this statute, “a motorist who operates a vehicle in Idaho 
implicitly consents to evidentiary testing, provided that the police officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe the motorist is intoxicated.”  State v. Nicolescu, 
156 Idaho 287, 290, 323 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Ct. App. 2014).  Contrary to Lutton’s 
assertions on appeal, application of the law to the facts found by the district court 
support the district court’s conclusion that the officers had reasonable grounds to 
believe Lutton had been driving while intoxicated and that Lutton impliedly 
consented to the blood draw. 
1. The Officers Had Reasonable Grounds To Request An Evidentiary 
Test Under Idaho Code § 18-8002 
 
The district court found that the officers had reasonable grounds to 
believe that Lutton was operating a motor vehicle while he was under the 
influence.  (See R., pp. 65-71.)  The district court reviewed the evidence and 
found that because Lutton admitted to driving, admitted to losing control of his 
car, admitted to crashing his car into the reservoir, and admitted to drinking 
earlier in the day, because Officer Anjelkovich, while she was speaking with 
Lutton, could smell alcohol coming from the vehicle where Lutton was riding, the 
“officers had ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that Lutton was impaired under 
Idaho Code § 18-8002.”  (R., pp. 70-71.)   
At the time of the request for an evidentiary test, the officers knew 
that Lutton lost control of his vehicle which crashed into the 
reservoir, and that there was reason to believe that there would be 
a fatality.  Lutton’s two year old was in the vehicle when the vehicle 
crashed into the water.  Lutton and his four year old son were able 
to get to shore.   was left in the water when Lutton left the 
scene for the hospital.  Lutton admitted he had consumed alcohol 
prior to 3 p.m.  Lutton did not admit to drinking after 3 p.m.  While 
speaking with Lutton, Officer Anjelkovich could smell alcohol 
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coming from Mikitish’s vehicle at about 11:00 p.m.  Under these 
circumstances, the Court will find that the officers had “reasonable 
grounds” to believe that Lutton was impaired under Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002.  Further, the Court will find that the officers had 
“probable cause” to believe the circumstances constituted vehicular 
manslaughter under Idaho Code § 18-4006(3).  As a result, 
Trooper Vance was authorized to seek a blood sample for analysis.  
 
(R., pp. 70-71.)1 
 On appeal, Lutton argues the district court erred when it determined the 
officers had “reasonable grounds” to believe that Lutton was under the influence 
when he was driving and thus could not request a blood draw.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 9-14.)  Lutton argues that his admission to drinking, his losing control of the 
car, his crashing the car into the reservoir, and the smell of alcohol when Officer 
Anjelkovich first approached him are not enough to establish “reasonable 
grounds” because “reasonable grounds” requires more evidence.  (See id.)  
Lutton’s argument is misplaced.   
“[T]he proper standard for administering an evidentiary test for the 
purpose of criminal DUI is ‘reasonable grounds.’”  Nicolescu, 156 Idaho at 290, 
323 P.3d at 1251.  “‘Reasonable grounds’ is not defined by statute, nor has it 
been defined by case law in the context of evidentiary testing.”  Id.  The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has, however, provided some guidance regarding the threshold 
necessary to establish “reasonable grounds.”  Id.  For example, “the odor of 
alcohol and the presence of beer cans in a vehicle were sufficient evidence to 
                                            
1 The district court found that the statute that authorizes the police to conduct a 
blood draw if there is probable cause the driver committed vehicular 
manslaughter is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the recent cases that 
hold implied consent is revocable.  (R., p. 73.)  Therefore, in reaching its ultimate 
decision, the district court did not rely upon this statute.   
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conduct a blood alcohol test.”  Id. (citing State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 713, 
184 P.3d 215, 219 (Ct. App. 2008) (overruled on other grounds) (“Indeed, from 
the odor of alcohol and presence of beer cans in his vehicle, there was ample 
evidence that DeWitt had been driving under the influence at the time of the 
accident.”); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 489, 680 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 
1984) (full and empty beer cans and the strong odor of alcohol)).  Here, there 
was more evidence suggesting Lutton was under the influence than in these two 
cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals.  Lutton admitted to drinking, Lutton 
lost control of his car, Lutton crashed his car into the reservoir, and Officer 
Anjelkovich smelled alcohol when she first contacted Lutton.   
Lutton’s argument is based upon looking at each of these facts in isolation 
and not considering the totality of the circumstances.  Lutton’s arguments are not 
based upon a claim that the district court incorrectly interpreted the law; rather 
Lutton argues the district court incorrectly interpreted the facts.  Looking at the 
totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe 
Lutton was under the influence.  The district court rejected Lutton’s interpretation 
of the facts, and so should this Court.    
Lutton argues that the district court erred in finding “reasonable grounds” 
because Officer Zimmer and Trooper Vance did not smell alcohol on Lutton’s 
person.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  The district court considered the testimony of 
Officer Zimmer (R., p. 68) and Trooper Vance (R., p. 67) and still found that, 
“While speaking with Lutton, Officer Anjeklovitch [sic] could smell alcohol coming 
from Mikitish’s vehicle at about 11:00 p.m.”  (R., p. 70.)  The district court did not 
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err.  Officer Zimmer testified that while he did not smell alcohol when he spoke 
with Lutton in the ambulance, he did not recall if he was actively attempting to 
smell alcohol.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 67, L. 22 – p. 70, L. 4.)  In addition, once Lutton 
was put in the ambulance, the paramedics removed his clothes and he was nude 
except for a blanket.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 102, L. 23 – p. 103, L. 1.)  By the time 
Trooper Vance made contact with Lutton in the emergency room, Lutton was still 
only wearing the blanket and it was over an hour after Officer Anjelkovich had 
first made contact.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 4-11, p. 19 , Ls. 7-14.)  Therefore, it is 
perfectly understandable that Officer Anjelkovich would smell alcohol upon first 
contact with Lutton and Officer Zimmer and Trooper Vance would not – because 
Lutton’s clothes had been removed and he was receiving medical treatment.2   
 Lutton also argues that his admission to drinking three beers more than 
nine hours before the accident does not establish reasonable grounds. 
(R., p. 12.)  Officer Anjelkovich testified that in her 20-plus years’ experience of 
investigating DUIs, individuals who are driving under the influence of alcohol very 
often minimize the amount of alcohol they have actually consumed.  (3/12/15 Tr., 
p. 56, L. 24 – p. 57, L. 6.)   
 Lutton also argues that the “bare existence of an accident” does not 
“equate [to] a driving pattern evidencing impairment.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  
However, even Lutton’s interpretation of the facts contradicts this argument.  
(See id.)  Lutton claims he lost control on a washboard and overcorrected.  (See 
                                            
2 In addition, Trooper Vance testified that he has a deviated septum and has 
difficulty smelling anything.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 8 – p. 17, L. 4.)   
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id.)  Contrary to Lutton’s argument, this is evidence of an impaired driving 
pattern.  Driving on a washboard does not normally cause one to lose control, 
and an inability to properly correct the car is also evidence of impaired driving.3  
Finally, Lutton’s argument is again undone by his attempt to analyze each piece 
of evidence individually and not under the totality of the circumstances.   
The district court properly considered the totality of the circumstances and 
correctly held the officers had reasonable grounds to believe Lutton was driving 
while impaired.   
2. Lutton Did Not Withdraw His Implied Consent 
 
Statutory implied consent is revocable.  See State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 
643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014) (“Inherent in the requirement that consent be 
voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent.”).  The Court 
reinforced that holding in a subsequent case, explaining that “a suspect can 
withdraw his or her statutorily implied consent to a test for the presence of 
alcohol.”  State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014).  
Under Idaho case law, a driver’s implied consent is valid so long as it is 
voluntary.  For implied consent to be voluntary, drivers must (1) give their initial 
consent voluntarily and (2) continue to give voluntary consent.  State v. Wulff, 
157 Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014).  “Drivers in Idaho give their initial 
consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily.”  Id. (citing 
                                            
3 This Court should reject Lutton’s reliance and interpretation of a newspaper 
article because it was not presented to or considered by the district court.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, p. 13, n. 3.)   
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State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007)).  The driver’s 
consent continues to be voluntary until he or she withdraws that consent by 
rejecting or resisting the evidentiary testing.  Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646, 339 P.3d 
at 371.  Therefore, if a suspect does not affirmatively reject or resist the 
evidentiary testing authorized by I.C. § 18-8002(1), the consent exception 
remains valid and no warrant is required.  See id.   
The district court found that Lutton did not withdraw his implied consent.  
(R., p. 74.)  On appeal, Lutton argues that he did not voluntarily consent to the 
blood draw because he was told it was mandatory and the officers would not let 
him see his son until he gave blood.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-23.)  Further, 
Lutton argues that his cooperation with the blood draw and the fact he never said 
“no” was not enough to show he voluntarily consented to the blood draw.  (See 
id. (“That Mr. Lutton was cooperative and did not say ‘no’ to the blood draw fails 
to establish that he continued to voluntarily consent to the blood draw.”).)  
Lutton’s arguments are not supported by the record or applicable law.   
First, the district court found Lutton’s testimony – that he was barred from 
seeing his son, and that he was told the blood draw was mandatory – was not 
credible.  (R., p. 74.)   
Having observed the witnesses and listened to the testimony, the 
Court did not find that Lutton was credible when he testified that he 
was told that he could not refuse and that the blood draw was 
mandatory[.]  The Court did not find that Lutton was credible when 
he testified he was told repeatedly that he could not see his son 
unless he provided a blood sample.  The Court found the contrary 
testimony of Trooper Vance credible on these same points.  
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(Id.)  The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion.  Karla Sampson, a 
staff chaplain at St. Luke’s, testified that when she asked the police officers if 
Lutton could go see his son, the police officers said that would not be a problem.  
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 13-24, p. 87, Ls. 5-18; see also R., p. 68 (“[Ms. Sampson] 
requested the officer permit Lutton to be with his child and they agreed.”).)   
 Second, contrary to Lutton’s argument, the fact that Lutton was 
cooperative and did not say ‘no’ to the blood draw does, in fact, establish that he 
did not revoke his implied consent.  A driver’s consent continues to be voluntary 
until he or she withdraws that consent by rejecting or resisting the evidentiary 
testing.  Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646, 339 P.3d at 371.  Therefore, if a suspect 
does not affirmatively reject or resist the evidentiary testing authorized by 
I.C. § 18-8002(1), the consent exception remains valid and no warrant is 
required.  See id.; see also Sims v. State, 159 Idaho 249, 257, 358 P.3d 810, 
818 (Ct. App. 2015) (alleged unconsciousness of the driver does not effectively 
operate as a withdrawal of implied consent).  Lutton testified he did not refuse to 
give blood and “did not say no.”  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 103, Ls. 6-15; see also R., p. 69 
(“Lutton agrees he did not refuse or object.”) (citation omitted).)  The district court 
did not err when it held that Lutton did not revoke his implied consent.     
 
D. Under The Totality Of The Circumstances Lutton Gave Actual Consent, In 
Addition To Implied Consent, To The Blood Draw 
 
The officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Lutton was operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence.  However, even if the officers did not 
have the reasonable grounds required to conduct a blood draw pursuant to 
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Lutton’s “implied” consent under Idaho Code § 18-8002, Lutton gave “actual” 
consent to the blood draw, which is not dependent on any statutory 
requirements.  “Implied” consent and “actual” consent are two different types of 
consent.  See e.g. State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, __, 371 P.3d 316, 320 (2016) 
(“As we concluded in [State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 371 P.3d 293 (2016)], 
under [Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1562 (2013)], implied consent 
may satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement.  Therefore, actual 
consent is not required.”).   
Motorists who drive on Idaho roads implicitly consent to a blood test if an 
officer has “reasonable grounds” to believe they are driving under the influence.  
Id. at __, 371 P.3d at 319.  This implicit consent is revocable.  Id. at __, 371 P.3d 
at 319-320.  However, “actual” consent requires that under the totality of the 
circumstances the defendant to affirmatively voluntarily consent to the search.  
See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.   
Trooper Vance testified that Lutton affirmatively consented to having his 
blood drawn.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-11, p. 9, Ls. 7-9, p. 25, Ls. 8-14.)   
Q. And then you told him he had to have a blood draw, and he 
said okay? 
 
A. He said okay when I asked for the blood draw. 
 
(3/12/15 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 2-4.)  The district court found:  
In the court’s view, Lutton was advised of the consequences of 
refusing the blood draw, and Lutton agreed to provide a sample.   
 
(R., p. 74.) 
 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court is persuaded that 
Lutton was the driver, was properly advised, and did not revoke or 
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withdraw his implied consent, and he voluntarily consented to the 
blood draw.  
 
(R., p. 74 (emphasis added).)   
 
 On appeal, Lutton argues his consent was not voluntary.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 17-23.)  As noted above, Lutton’s argument that his consent was not 
valid because he was not allowed to see his son is not supported by the record, 
because the district court did not find his testimony on that subject credible.  
(See R., p. 74.)   
Further, the totality of the circumstances supports a finding of voluntary 
consent because the officers did not threaten, yell, overbear or otherwise 
mistreat Lutton.  In fact, the evidence shows they were compassionate and 
courteous towards Lutton because of his son.  Trooper Vance testified: 
Q. And, [Trooper] Vance, did you at any time raise your voice to 
Mr. Lutton? 
 
A. No. 
 
Q. Did you handcuff him? 
 
A. No. 
 
Q. Did you, in any way, restrain him? 
 
A. I was sitting on a stool.  I was actually sitting lower than him, 
talking to him next to him.  
 
Q. And were you trying to be sympathetic to this gentleman? 
 
A. Yeah.  I’m a father.  I know.   
 
(3/12/15 Tr., 30, L. 19 – p. 31, L. 4.)  Officer Anjelkovich also testified that she 
could hear some of Trooper Vance’s conversation with Lutton, and she never 
heard Trooper Vance yell, make demands, or threaten Lutton.  (3/12/15 Tr., 
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p. 44, Ls. 1-11.)  Nurse Chapman also testified that Lutton was not in handcuffs 
and the officers were not “loud talking” or otherwise being unpleasant.  (3/12/15 
Tr., p. 63, Ls. 4-11.)  Officer Zimmer testified that he never heard Trooper Vance 
raise his voice and all the officers appeared empathetic towards Lutton.  (3/12/15 
Tr., p. 73, L. 25 – p. 74, L. 20.)  Ms. Sampson, the chaplain, testified that when 
she asked the officers if Lutton could see his child, the officers allowed Lutton to 
go see his son.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 87, Ls. 5-18.)  Lutton even testified that he was 
not in handcuffs and the officer was courteous to him.  (3/12/15 Tr., p. 102, 
Ls. 19-22.)   
Under the totality of the circumstances Lutton gave actual voluntary 
consent to the blood draw.  Therefore, even if there were no “reasonable 
grounds” as required for “implied” consent – the district court still did not err 
because, under the totality of the circumstances, Lutton gave “actual” consent.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court.   
 DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016. 
 
       
 /s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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